欧盟的整体结构以德国为基础，持续进行的欧洲计划取决于德国的行动——它将保持和放弃哪种桥梁关系。
选择
当思考法德联盟在一个扩张的欧洲前景如何时，人们不应忽略上述基本事实。本质上，这一现实的存在使德国的对外政策不得不在最大限度和范围内保持平衡。
同时，有些情况如下所述，还保持原状。首先，在反对伊拉克战争的问题上，德国没有打破它基本的对外政策之一，即从不在法国和美国之间作出选择。其次，德国和法国若想单独为整个欧洲拿主意，欧盟和美国之间的关系就太重要了。
在涉及跨大西洋关系方面，欧盟需要以一个整体来作出反应。
欧洲的中心桥梁
德国在这一不可高估的现实问题中发挥了中心作用。它一直是，并且仍然是联结现在欧盟内外大部分结构的桥梁。
1、作为欧洲地缘战略的焦点，德国是一座通向美国的桥梁。尽管英国与美国，以及布莱尔和布什之间存在所谓的"特殊关系"，这一点仍不容置疑。
保持对其他方的控制
2、 德国是一座通向法国的桥梁。它是唯一能够全力应对法国对自主的强烈要求的国家，它成功地使法国介入跨大西洋关系，并使法国感到在一个扩张后的欧洲中没有被边缘化。
3、 第三，德国还是一座通向英国的桥梁。它使得具有退出倾向的大英王国步入欧盟一体化的轨道。
4、 德国还是一座通向与其接壤的东欧的桥梁。
5、 最后，德国一直是欧盟众多的小成员国的调停者和倡议者。
经过数年的紧张关系之后，法德伙伴关系像以往一样健康和牢固，这是好事。在2003年10月中旬布鲁塞尔举行的欧盟峰会上，由希拉克代表施罗德出席会议是两国合作达到新水平的标志。
权力重新定位
并不是法德联盟中的所有东西都会保持不变。在一个扩张的欧洲，这对搭挡对于持续的成功是关键的，但它们单独还不足以做出决策。
法德还需要其它合作伙伴——尤其是英国——当涉及到安全和防务措施时。2003年9月在柏林举行的德法英峰会上，英国表示了对法德防务新365JT规划的兴趣，因而此次峰会特别有前景。
不同的观点
然而，尽管德法两国目前处于蜜月时期，它们对欧洲前途的走向可能持有不同观点，这是最值得我们关注的。
一方面，欧盟东扩从不是法国政府关键的对外政策目标。另一方面，从90年代初期以来德国一直将欧盟在其东部边界之外的扩充视为对外政策的核心目标。
在发行统一货币欧元的过程中，法德双方曾经不得不共同肩负起沉重的负担。不同的是，欧盟东扩在两个国家的眼中并不必然是一件共同承担的任务。
法德能否真正成功地建立一个扩大和高效的欧盟所需要的组织结构，我们目前还不清楚。
一个成功的联盟？
人们仍需静观共同的宪法草案能否在不作实质性改动的情况下通过欧盟委员会——就像法德希望的那样。
另外，尽管在2002年10月两国达成了农产品补贴的谅解，有关欧盟东扩的融资问题仍未确定。
前途胜算几何
更糟的是，法德面临着长期而艰难的谈判和争论，以满足2006年生效的预算和债务需要。
一个目前致力于扩大其地缘政治面积的欧盟不能继续把它一半的资源花在农业上。
结果，对于德国的核心欧洲政策——欧盟东扩，法国具有使其陷入僵局的决定性能力。1965年法国曾动用力量使欧盟在农业问题上陷入僵局。
德国的两难问题在于，它在欧盟东扩问题上无法避免地需要法国支持，但却可能承担不起法国的要价，即它所规划的欧盟之内的"核心欧洲"（core-Europe）——而这正是法国所希望的。
我的结论
根据上述分析得出三点结论。第一，由法国领导的核心欧洲没有成功的机会，它甚至会给德国带来严重的危险。
第二，德国起到了桥梁建造者和维护者的作用，其终极目标是欧盟的稳定，因此它在自己的国家利益方面没有多少回旋余地。
为何美国的政策事关紧要?
最后，如果美国继续"忽视德国"（ ignore Germany）——就像国家安全顾问赖斯（Condoleezza Rice）在报道曾经主张那样——美国就采取了一种根本不恰当的政策。
其实，事实正好相反。德国能否继续并且愿意继续承担五重欧洲桥梁的任务，将取决于美国政府的行动。
附：原文网址及内容
http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3579
Tony Blair - or Germany - as Europe's Bridge?
By Ulrike Guérot | Friday, November 14, 2003
Are Germany and France engaged in an alliance that basically excludes others? Ulrike Guérot, of the German Council on Foreign Relations, argues that her country must stay on a balanced course between the United States and France. She also maps out her country's five-fold bridging function in Europe - and beyond.
The entire structure of the European Union rests upon Germany, and the continuing European project depends on which bridges Germany maintains - and which ones it may possibly decide to abandon.
The choice
When contemplating the future of the French-German alliance in an expanded Europe, one must not lose sight of this basic fact. In essence, it poses the greatest balancing act German foreign policy has ever had to confront.
Meanwhile, the facts remain as follows: First, in opposing the Iraq war, Germany did not break one of its basic foreign policy principles - that is, never to choose between France and the United States.，Second, the relationship between the European Union and the United States is too important for France and Germany to presume that they could single-handedly take on the role of decision-maker for all of Europe.
As far as transatlantic relations are concerned, the European Union needs to respond as a whole.
The central bridge of Europe
Still, Germany has a central role in this matter that cannot be overestimated. It has been - and remains - a bridge that holds together much of the current internal and external structure of the European Union.
1. Germany functions as a bridge to the United States - as a geo-strategic focal point of Europe. This is true despite the "special relationship" between Great Britain and the United States - and Tony Blair and George W. Bush.
Keeping others in check
2. Germany is a bridge to France - as the only nation that can funnel France's urge for independence, successfully involve France in the transatlantic relationship - and make the French feel that they are not being marginalized in an expanded Europe.
3. Germany furthermore functions as a bridge, third, to Great Britain - by keeping the withdrawal-prone kingdom on an integration track.
4. It is a bridge to Eastern Europe, which borders Germany.
5. Finally, Germany has always been a mediator and an advocate for the numerous small EU member states.
After years of tension, the French-German partnership is as healthy and solid as ever, which is a good thing. The representation of Gerhard Schr?der by Jacques Chirac at the EU-Summit in Brussels in mid-October 2003 is symbolic for the new level of collaboration between the two nations.
Relocation of powers
Still, not everything in the French-German alliance will remain as it is. In an expanded Europe, the pair will be crucial for continued success, but Germany and France alone will not be enough to make decisions.
Other coalition partners will be needed - in particular Great Britain - when security and defense measures are concerned. The German-French-British summit in Berlin in September 2003, at which the British voiced interest in the French-German defense initiative, was especially promising.
Differing views
However, the most important concern is that Germany and France - despite their current love affair - may not share similar views on Europe's future.
The Eastern expansion of the EU was never a key foreign policy goal of the French government. Germany, on the other hand, has viewed the growth of the European Union beyond its Eastern border as a quintessential foreign policy objective since the early 1990s.
Unlike the introduction of the common currency, for which both France and Germany had to shoulder heavy burdens, the Eastern expansion of the EU is not necessarily a mutual project in the eyes of the two nations.
It still remains unclear whether France and Germany can really succeed to bring about the institutional structure that is required for an expanded and efficient European Union.
A successful alliance?
For one, it remains to be seen whether the draft for a common constitution will pass the council conference unscathed - as both France and Germany hope it will.
Second, in spite of the compromise on agricultural subsidies reached between the two nations in October 2002, the financing of the expansion remains uncertain.
What the future holds...
To make things worse, France and Germany face long and tough negotiations and debates to accommodate new budgetary and debt requirements taking effect in 2006.
An expanded European Union that is currently working on enhancing its geopolitical dimension cannot continue to spend 50% of its resources on agriculture.
As a result, France has a decisive "deadlocking capacity" over Germany's core concern of European policy: the European Union's eastern expansion. Once before, in 1965, did France use its power to deadlock the EU over questions regarding agriculture.
The German dilemma is that it inevitably needs France for Europe's expansion, but may not be able to pay the high price of a French-designed 'core-Europe' within the European Union - something the French may be hoping for.
My conclusions
A threefold conclusion therefore emerges: First, a core Europe led by France has no chance of succeeding - and even poses grave a danger for Germany.
Second, judging from its role of bridge builder and maintainer, Germany has little maneuvering room for national interests, considering that its ultimate goal is the stability of the European Union.
Why U.S. policy matters
Lastly, the United States would hence choose a fundamentally unsuitable policy if it continued - as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reportedly has advocated - to "ignore Germany."
In fact, the opposite is true: It will depend on the actions of the U.S administration whether Germany can sustain - and is willing to remain - in its role as the five-dimensional European bridge.
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